ARTICLES
THE SUPREME COURT AS THE MAJOR BARRIER TO 
series of subsequent decisions attacked this fiction, and for a period of nearly twenty years, the Court was intent on eliminating the vestiges of segregation in the schools, approving broad remedial orders. This changed drastically beginning in 1974 when the Court began limiting the available remedies and relieving school systems of the burdens imposed by court orders. Around the same time, the Court decided that equal protection plaintiffs needed to show a discriminatory governmental purpose in order to trigger meaningful constitutional protection. This meant that facially neutral laws and practices with discriminatory effects were largely constitutional.

Beginning with Bakke in 1978, the Court made it difficult, and eventually nearly impossible, for government to take affirmative steps designed to promote equality. A majority of the Court determined that invidious and benign racial classifications should be treated the same under the Equal Protection Clause, with both subjected to strict scrutiny. This completed the Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in a manner that makes it a real barrier to racial equality: government is free to engage in invidious discrimination as long as it masks the real purpose, and affirmative steps designed by government to promote equality will be struck down as a violation of equal protection.
Ironically, the constitutional amendment designed to promote freedom and equality for the newly-freed slaves now stands in the way of true freedom and equality.
I. INTRODUCTION
After the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery in 1865, it became apparent that the abolition of slavery as an institution would not assure freedom and equality. This recognition led to the adoption of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, prohibiting states from "deny[ing] to any person within [their] jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 1 At a minimum, this clause was designed to address the inequality encountered by the newly-freed slaves. It was an early acknowledgement that merely eliminating legal approval and recognition of discrimination, in the form of slavery, would not lead to equality. Today, 140 years after adoption of the Equal Protection Clause and the passage of several federal antidiscrimination statutes, we remain in essentially the same position-racial minorities do not enjoy equality in the United States.
My goal is not to demonstrate the absence of racial equality in some of the most important aspects of our lives, such as health care, education, housing, employment, political influence, and access to resources. Rather, I assume inequality exists and attempt to identify the single most responsible branch of government. Much to my dismay, I conclude the U.S. Supreme Court, sitting at the top of our system of justice, is most culpable. In this period of 140 years, there is a very short period of time, roughly between 1954 and 1973, 2 during which the Court demonstrated a willingness to use the Fifth 3 and Fourteenth Amendments to promote racial equality. This is not to suggest that the executive and legislative branches have promoted racial equality consistently since 1868. While the record of these branches is not stellar, I believe it is better than that of the Court, even though the efforts of these two branches have been stymied frequently by the Court.
Part II of this Article briefly explores the context and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Part III, I examine (a) some of the key Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause before Brown; (b) the promise of Brown; (c) the Court's rejection of Brown beginning in 1974; and (d) the Court's decisions limiting the ability of the other branches to promote racial equality through legislation, by interpreting Section 5 of the Fourteenth race that through many generations had been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy." 11 Further, it said the Fourteenth Amendment "was designed to assure to the colored race the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under law are enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that race the protection of the general government, in that enjoyment, whenever it should be denied by the States." 12 Four years later, in Pace v. State, 13 the Court said the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause "was to prevent hostile and discriminating state legislation against any person or class of persons," 14 but upheld an Alabama law that provided a harsher punishment for adultery between a Negro and a white person than adultery between persons of the same race. 15 The same year, in The Civil Rights Cases, 16 the Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875, on the grounds that it exceeded the power of Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because it regulated private conduct, but described the Fourteenth Amendment as extending "its protection to races and classes, and prohibit [ing] any state legislation which has the effect of denying to any race or class, or to any individual, the equal protection of the laws." 17 In Plessy v. Ferguson, 18 the Court upheld public transportation facilities separated by race, saying that while the object of the [fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, . . . in the nature of things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. 19 In Brown v. Board of Education, 20 before the Court rejected Plessy and held that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal," 21 it scheduled reargument that was: largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively 11. Id. at 306. In this context, the Court stated that the "recently emancipated" race "especially needed protection against unfriendly action in the States where they were resident," id. (emphasis added), suggesting the Equal Protection Clause was not aimed at friendly action, such as affirmative steps to assure equality. See id.
12. consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive. 22 Because of the status of public education in 1868, the Court noted it was not surprising that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment provided little guidance "relating to its intended effect on public education." 23 The first clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to overrule the Dred Scott v. Sandford 24 decision. Beyond that, the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to supplement the Thirteenth Amendment, at least with respect to the former slaves, because the framers recognized that legal status alone does not lead to equality. Similarly, the current status of racial minorities in the United States makes it apparent that neither a constitutional provision nor statutes prohibiting intentional race discrimination lead to equality. As with most provisions of the Constitution, reasonable people can disagree about the appropriate interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. But the early decisions of the Court referred to above, while generally not favorable to the parties alleging race discrimination, suggest that they were (a) designed to supplement the Thirteenth Amendment in that the abolition of slavery did not assure freedom and equality; 25 (b) aimed at the facially discriminatory laws that existed in many states and stood in the way of "absolute equality;" 26 and (c) aimed at prohibiting state laws that have the effect of denying equal protection of the laws. 27 Most importantly, there is nothing in either the history of the Equal Protection Clause or the generally unfavorable pre-Brown decisions that precludes an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that would promote actual equality, instead of only formal equality. 32 Justice Harlan wrote a lengthy dissent, arguing that those who operate public accommodations are "agents of the state," and thus subject to regulation by Congress when they engage in race discrimination. 33 In 1896, the Court determined, in Plessy v. Ferguson, that "equal but separate" transportation accommodations for the white and "colored" races did not violate equal protection. 34 Such laws, according to the Court, "do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other," and the Court referred to the plaintiff's assumption that the "enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority" as the "underlying fallacy" of his argument. 35 Justice Harlan, in dissent, indicated everyone knows that the Louisiana statute "had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons." 36 He accurately predicted that the judgment in Plessy "will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case." 37 "Separate but equal" remained the law until Brown was decided in 1954, although in between Plessy and Brown, the Court found a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in a few cases where the educational opportunity was clearly not equal. 38 Ten years before Brown, there was yet another low point in the history of the United States Supreme Court when it concluded, in Korematsu v. United States, 39 that the federal government's placement of Japanese-Americans in concentration camps did not violate equal protection because it was justified by national security concerns. 40 The Court reached this result even though it stated "that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect" and are therefore subjected to "the most rigid scrutiny." 41 While he said the Court was utilizing "the most rigid scrutiny," it is quite apparent that Justice Black, who delivered the opinion of the Court, was deferring to the judgment of the United States military. 42 Justice Murphy wrote that he dissents "from this legalization of racism" and indicated that racial discrimination "is utterly revolting among a free people who have embraced the principles set forth in the Constitution of the United States." 43 Even though a few challenges to racial classifications, based on the Equal Protection Clause, were successful before Brown, the Court had rendered the clause quite ineffective in addressing race discrimination. Race discrimination flourished under the "separate but equal" regime because the equal portion of the equation generally was not enforced by courts. There was no way to fit Korematsu into 36. Id. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting 
B. Brown and Its Short-Lived Promise
If we accept Justice Douglas's bleak assessment of the situation, only the death of Chief Justice Vinson during the summer of 1953, and the appointment of Earl Warren as his replacement, led to the unanimous decision in Brown, holding that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." 46 Therefore, the segregation in the five school districts before the Court violated equal protection; and, after further argument, in 1955, the Court determined the appropriate remedy, which essentially deferred to the trial courts for the application of equitable principles and created the famous "all deliberate speed" standard of the Court. 47 Not surprisingly, the mere elimination of Jim Crow laws, such as laws providing for segregated schools, did not lead to equality. For a period of approximately fifteen years, it appeared the Court was serious about ending segregation in public education. In the early years after its decision in Brown, the Court was adamant about not only eliminating the laws providing for segregation in education but also eliminating the effects of that government-approved discrimination. In Cooper v. Aaron, 48 52 the Court declared that school boards have "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch," and held that a "'freedom-of-choice' plan" violated equal protection. 53 (1973) . Although the Denver school system was never segregated by mandate of state or local law, the Court held that "a finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system . . . creates a presumption that other segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious" and creates "a prima facie case of unlawful segregative design," shifting the burden to the school system to prove "that other segregated schools within the system are not also the result of intentionally segregative actions. Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-district remedy, it must first be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district. Specifically, it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation. 67 Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by three other Justices, in which he noted that the decision in Milliken "cripples the ability of the judiciary to perform [its remedial] task," and, as a result, "deliberate acts of segregation and their consequences will go unremedied, not because a remedy would be infeasible or unreasonable in terms of the usual criteria governing school desegregation cases, but because an effective remedy would cause what the Court considers to be undue administrative inconvenience to the State." 68 As a result, Justice White observed, the "State of Michigan, the entity at which the Fourteenth Amendment is directed, has successfully insulated itself from its duty to provide effective desegregation remedies by vesting sufficient power over its public schools in its local school districts." 69 Thus, within a year after its decision in Norwood, the Court signaled it was not willing to use the Equal Protection Clause to abolish segregation when it placed substantial limits on the power of the courts to "impose a multidistrict, area wide remedy to a singledistrict de jure segregation problem." 70 It did this even though it said, in Brown, that "the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place" in the "field of public education" and "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal." 71 When combined with its decision a year earlier, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 72 the effect of Milliken was disastrous. Those who favor segregated schools had won the battle; Brown, while not overruled, had become fairly irrelevant. By the 1972-73 school year, over ninety-one percent of southern schools were desegregated; however, between 1988 and 1998, most of the progress was lost. 73 Milliken was followed by a series of Supreme Court decisions that fatally wounded the Equal Protection Clause as an agent of racial equality. Shortly after Milliken, the Court delivered an important blow to the Equal Protection Clause in Davis, 74 holding that "[t]he central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race" and that "disproportionate impact . . . alone . . . does not trigger the rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations." 75 In short, Washington v. Davis requires that plaintiffs alleging racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause prove intentional discrimination, that is, that the challenged action was taken "'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects." 76 78 in which Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, said "having once implemented a racially neutral attendance pattern in order to remedy the perceived constitutional violations on the part of the defendants, the District Court had fully performed its function of providing the appropriate remedy for previous racially discriminatory attendance patterns." 79 In other words, the federal courts were not to police the school districts to guard against resegregation. The Court made it clear that the Equal Protection Clause does not ban segregation nor assure actual equality in public education; rather, it bans only intentional discrimination, that is, segregation that is the result of intentional government action. 80 Thus, by 1976, only twenty-two years after Brown, it was apparent that the Fourteenth Amendment would tolerate a public education system that is "inherently unequal" by virtue of its segregated schools, so long as a challenger could not prove the segregation resulted from government action intended to achieve a segregated school system. 81 When this is combined with the decision in Rodriguez, 82 holding that a large disparity in per-pupil expenditures in different school districts within a state that opts for local control and funding does not violate the Equal Protection 77. Id. (citation omitted). Justice Stevens concurred in both Davis and Feeney. In Davis, he observed "that the line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader of the Court's opinion might assume." 426 U.S. at 254 (Stevens, J., concurring). He states that not every disproportionate impact gives rise to a constitutional claim, but where "the disproportion is dramatic . . . it really does not matter whether the standard is phrased in terms of purpose or effect." Id. The challenge to the test at issue was insufficient, according to Stevens, because the test served "a neutral and legitimate purpose of requiring all applicants to meet a minimum standard of literacy" and was "used throughout the federal service." Id. at 254-55. Justice Stevens agreed with the outcome in Feeney because "the number of males disadvantaged by [the Massachusetts law] (1,867,000) is sufficiently large-and sufficiently close to the number of disadvantaged females (2,954,000)-to refute the claim that the rule was intended to benefit males as a class over females as a class." 442 U.S. at 281 (Stevens, J., concurring Clause, 83 the Court's license to the states to operate a public school system providing children with an education that is "inherently unequal" was granted in full. 84 As a result, today we have states operating school systems in which the per-pupil expenditure varies widely, depending on the district's property tax base, and in which many children attend schools that are predominantly one race. 85 Frequently, the school districts with the lowest per-pupil expenditure are those with the largest racial minority population. 86 Any doubt about the Court's willingness to tolerate segregated schools was eliminated in Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 87 in which Justice Rehnquist, again writing for the Court, held that school districts were entitled to be relieved of burdensome court orders that displaced local authority at the point the school district can demonstrate that the "vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable." 88 In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, expressed his belief that "a desegregation decree cannot be lifted so long as conditions likely to inflict the stigmatic injury condemned in Brown I persist and there remain feasible methods of eliminating such conditions." 89 The relieved of the provisions of a court order part-by-part. 91 In this case, the school district was entitled to be relieved of the portion of the order requiring desegregation in pupil assignment and in facilities, because those terms had been met, even though the school district had not complied with a provision relating to the assignment of teachers. 92 Further, since the facilities portion of the order had been met, the district court could not review the discriminatory effects of the district's plan to build a facility that would likely be of greater benefit to white students than black students. 93 Finally, in Missouri v. Jenkins, 94 the Court terminated a school desegregation order governing the Kansas City Schools, holding (i) that the district court's attempt to attract nonminority students from outside the district was impermissible because there had been no showing of an interdistrict violation, (ii) the district court lacked authority to order an increase in teachers' salaries, based on its belief that such an increase designed to attract teachers was essential for desegregation, and (iii) the continuing disparity in student test scores did not justify retaining the desegregation order because the Constitution requires only equal opportunity, not any particular result. 95 Even though the 1977 district court order was making a difference by reducing the number of black children enrolled in schools with a ninety percent or more black enrollment, the Court was willing to abandon the "project. 99 When the case was filed, over ninetyeight percent of the veterans in Massachusetts were male and the district court referred to the absolute preference provided by the statute as having "a devastating impact upon the employment opportunities of women." 100 So, the discriminatory effect of the statute was obvious. However, the Court said the dispositive question "is whether the appellee has shown that a gender-based discriminatory purpose has, at least in some measure, shaped the Massachusetts veterans' preference legislation." 101 Ms. Feeney's "ultimate argument rest[ed] upon the presumption, common to the criminal and civil law, that a person intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of his voluntary actions." 102 After conceding that it would be "disingenuous to say that the adverse consequences of this legislation for women were unintended, in the sense that they were not volitional or in the sense that they were not foreseeable," 103 the Court went on to explain that "discriminatory purpose," for purposes of equal protection litigation, "implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences." 104 Rather, the challenger must show that the decisionmaker "selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." 105 The "discriminatory purpose" approach to race discrimination is somewhat at odds with current cognitive psychology, suggesting that race discrimination is often unconscious and that "unconscious racism . . . underlies much of the racially disproportionate impact of governmental policy." 106 A social cognition approach to discrimination is based on three premises: first, stereotyping or categorization is a common cognitive mechanism used by most people "to simplify the task of perceiving, processing, and retaining information about people in memory;" second, stereotypes operate as "person prototypes" or "social schemas" that function as "implicit theories, biasing in predictable ways the perception, interpretation, encoding, retention, and recall of information about other people," and these cognitive biases "operate absent intent to favor or disfavor members of a particular social group," and "bias a decisionmaker's judgment long before the 'moment of decision;'" and third, these stereotypes, "when they function as implicit prototypes or schemas, operate beyond the reach of decisionmaker self-awareness," making cognitive bias "both unintentional and unconscious." 107 These cognitive biases, because they operate automatically, "must be controlled, if at all, through subsequent 'mental correction.'" 108 As a result, "[t]o establish liability for . . . discrimination, a . . . plaintiff [should] simply be required to prove that his group status played a role in causing the employer's action or decision. Causation would no longer be equated with intentionality." 109 Even if the Court is correct in requiring the challenger who asserts a claim based on the Equal Protection Clause to show intent, why does it define intent differently than it is defined in a wellestablished body of, for example, tort law? A more appropriate way to determine the constitutionality of the Massachusetts statute would have been to find an intentional classification that disadvantaged female applicants, and then address whether the justification for the statute, that is, "to reward veterans for the sacrifice of military service, to ease the transition from military to civilian life, to encourage patriotic service, and to attract loyal and well-disciplined people to civil service occupations," 110 met the intermediate standard of review for sex discrimination.
As described by the Court in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 111 Washington v. Davis "made it clear that official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact," which, although not irrelevant, alone will not establish racially discriminatory intent or purpose. 112 The Court in Arlington Heights recognized that the challenger does not have "to prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes," but rather, that "a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating 107 factor in the decision." 113 It went on to describe how the challenger can attempt to prove this, through a showing of (a) a disproportionate impact, which in some cases may establish such a clear pattern that is "unexplainable on grounds other than race," (b) the historical background of the challenged decision, including the sequence of events leading to the decision, departures from the normal procedural sequence and substantive departures, and (c) the legislative or administrative history, particularly where there are contemporary statements are made by members of the body in the course of rendering the challenged decision. 114 Later, in Hunter v. Underwood, 115 the Court indicated that if the race discrimination plaintiff shows race was a substantial or motivating factor behind the law or decision that is challenged, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that the law would have been enacted without considering this factor. 116 In Hunter, a law that denied the right to vote to anyone who had been convicted of a crime involving "moral turpitude" had a substantial discriminatory impact against black residents of Alabama. 117 The Court agreed that race discrimination was a key purpose behind the legislation when it was adopted in 1901 and the government failed in its burden of demonstrating that the law would have been enacted without this consideration. 118 So property taxes as the primary source of funds. 120 Similarly, Milliken excuses states from responsibility to avoid segregation by establishing independent local school districts and allowing parental choice of residence to preclude court-ordered integration. 121 Davis provides the excuse to ignore the discriminatory effects of facially neutral government actions and insulates such effects from challenges based on the Equal Protection Clause, 122 unless the challenger can prove a discriminatory purpose, that is, the government "decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." 123 This means there is no equal protection problem where a state tolerates a predominantly white suburban school district, spending nearly $600 per pupil, while an adjoining predominantly minority urban school district spends around $350 per pupil. 124 Further, the fact that the education provided in these two districts is "inherently unequal" does not offend the Constitution.
Of course, the Court is not the sole cause of this tragic situation. There is plenty of blame to go around-the executive and legislative branches of government are partly responsible, and parents who select housing based, at least in part, on the type of education available play a role. But, the fact remains that the Court, through its interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, has paved the way for the segregated educational systems operating in many states. Not only has the Court interpreted the clause narrowly when those seeking equality rely on it, it has interpreted the clause broadly to prohibit benign race-conscious decisions when those opposed to government making race-conscious decisions to achieve equality challenge such decisions. As stated by Justice Marshall in Bakke,
[I]t must be remembered that, during most of the past 200 years, the Constitution as interpreted by this Court did not prohibit the most ingenious and pervasive forms of discrimination against the Negro. Now, when a State acts to remedy the effects of that legacy 124. In Rodriguez, a school district in the core-city of San Antonio, where approximately 90% of the students were Mexican-American and over 6% of the students were African-American, spent $356 per pupil, while another school district in San Antonio, where the student population was 18% Mexican-American and less than 1% African-American, spent $594 per student. 411 U.S. at 11-13. The Court decided there was no violation of equal protection. Id. at 28-29.
of discrimination, I cannot believe that this same Constitution stands as a barrier. 125 The point is that many low-income children are not receiving an adequate education in our public school system, and without such an education at the elementary and secondary level, it is difficult to level the playing field in the future. When low-income children receive an inferior education, this means a disproportionate number of minority children are receiving an inferior education. Unfortunately, being left behind in elementary and secondary education often results in being left behind in higher education and in employment. Recognizing the adverse effects of an inadequate education leads some higher educational institutions to take affirmative steps designed to compensate for the failures of public education. When these affirmative steps are challenged, the Supreme Court is very willing to use the Equal Protection Clause to strike them down. 126 The Court's decisions are, therefore, not only responsible for the need for affirmative, remedial steps, but also responsible for making it very difficult for the executive and legislative branches to take remedial action.
The Court has stood in the path of legislation aimed at promoting equality in three major ways. First, the Court has narrowed the scope of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby limiting the power of Congress to pass legislation. This started with the 1997 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 127 holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeded the Section 5 power of Congress because the "congruence and proportionality" between the injury to be addressed and the means utilized was lacking. 128 Second, the Court has insisted on applying strict scrutiny when facing a challenge to affirmative steps taken by government in an effort to promote racial equality and, as a result, it has found most such efforts to violate the Equal Protection Clause. 129 Third, the Rehnquist Court has narrowly interpreted civil rights statutes, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to the point that Congress has responded with several "restoration" acts. 130 2007), and clarifying that a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice that is unlawful under statutes prohibiting employment discrimination occurs each time compensation is paid pursuant to the discriminatory decision or practice); the impact of the Court's legal framework extends far beyond public education, promoting inequality in employment, contracting, housing, health care, and other aspects of society.
All of this leads me to conclude that the U.S. Supreme Court, since the mid-1970s and continuing to the present, is the institution most responsible for racial inequality in this country. It is indeed a sad state of affairs when the nation's "justice" system is the greatest cause of injustice. Even the Court recognizes that "compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment's ban on racial discrimination . . . bolsters the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system" 131 and that "[r]ace discrimination is 'especially pernicious in the administration of justice.'" 132 There is, indeed, reason to question the legitimacy of our justice system.
D. Blocking Political Branches' Attempts to Promote Equality
In a series of cases, beginning 137. I try to avoid using this term because it has a pejorative connotation, suggesting quotas and other sorts of horrible actions designed to disfavor white persons. discrimination, the Court, as early as Korematsu, indicated that legal restrictions on the rights of a single racial group were "immediately suspect" and subject to the "most rigid scrutiny." 138 Strict scrutiny requires the government to show that it has a compelling justification for the racial classification and that the means selected to accomplish its goal are the least restrictive or narrowly tailored. 139 When addressing invidious race discrimination, Korematsu remains the only case in which the Court found that government had met its burden. 140 In 146 held "that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny." 147 This means that all benign race-conscious actions, designed to promote racial equality, will be subjected to strict scrutiny, a standard that is nearly always fatal. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens refers to the Court's "disconcerting lecture about the evils of governmental racial classifications" and its assumption "that there is no significant difference between a decision by the majority to impose a special burden on the members of a minority race and a decision by the majority to provide a benefit to certain members of that minority notwithstanding its incidental burden on some members of the majority." 148 Justice Stevens states that the assumption of the majority is untenable because "[i]nvidious discrimination is an engine of oppression, subjugating a disfavored group to enhance or maintain the power of the majority. Remedial race-based preferences reflect the opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality in society." 149 When applying strict scrutiny, a racial classification can fail either because the government has not established a compelling justification or because the government fails to show that the means selected is narrowly tailored. The first prong of this standard can be satisfied when government is attempting to remedy past discrimination by the entity that is taking the affirmative steps. So, for example, if a minority proves invidious race discrimination by a municipality in hiring, as part of the remedy, the court may order the municipality to take affirmative steps to remedy that past wrong. If a municipality wants to take affirmative steps voluntarily to address past discrimination, it must establish a prima facie case that it has discriminated in the past in the particular activity at issue, such as employment or contracting. 150 Of course, most municipalities are reluctant to make a determination that they have engaged in invidious discrimination in the past.
The theory of unconscious discrimination, or implicit bias, 151 informs the need for and utility of affirmative steps designed to promote equality. Such affirmative steps can be seen "as attempts by the state to correct for implicit bias, and thus, to break the connection between such bias and outcomes" and a "preference for In seeking to define even in broad and general terms how far this remedial power extends it is important to remember that judicial powers may be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional violation. Remedial judicial authority does not put judges automatically in the shoes of school authorities whose powers are plenary. Judicial authority enters only when local authority defaults.
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities; absent a finding of a constitutional violation, however, that would not be within the authority of a federal court. those harmed by the biased assessments can help prevent the implicit bias from being translated into final outcomes." 152 Efforts to "debias" decisionmaking, both direct and indirect, can be enhanced by affirmative steps because "the presence of population diversity in an environment tends to reduce the level of implicit bias," 153 and affirmative steps can lead to increased diversity. 154 Further, by tolerating plans or programs calling for affirmative steps designed to promote equality, "the law is engaging in a form of indirect debiasing; that is, regulated actors are permitted to take steps that, in turn, tend to reduce implicit bias." 155 Two other authors argue that a proper interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII would allow employers to engage in affirmative action in order to produce a diverse workforce and thereby reduce implicit bias. 156 This empirical data supports a common sense notion that the most effective way to address the effects of discrimination in employment, for example, is to design a program that addresses the causes of unequal opportunity and, in fact, leads to more jobs for racial minorities. It is difficult to pretend we have eliminated race discrimination by simply passing laws making it illegal, but ignoring the fact that the results show little or no improvement in employment opportunities for racial minorities.
In the context of education, a majority of the Court, in Grutter v. Bollinger, 157 accepted diversity in an educational institution (a law school) as a compelling government interest. 158 However, the decision is narrow and such programs must meet the narrowly tailored requirement. 159 They cannot use a quota system, applicants must be evaluated individually, all factors that may contribute to student body diversity must be meaningfully considered along with race, the school must consider workable race-neutral alternatives, the raceconscious admissions program must not unduly harm members of any racial group, and the program should be limited in time. 160 The continuing vitality of Grutter was placed in issue when the Court, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 161 struck down the school districts' use of race in assigning students to a particular school in order to assure "that the racial balance at the school falls within a predetermined range based on the racial composition of the school district as a whole." 162 The Seattle School District, the Court noted, had "never operated segregated schools, nor . . . ha [d] it been subjected to court-ordered desegregation," but used "the racial tiebreaker in an attempt to address the effects of racially identifiable housing patterns on school assignments." 163 In contrast, the Jefferson County Public Schools, which operates the public school system in Louisville, Kentucky, had maintained a segregated school system until 1975 when the federal court entered a desegregation decree; however, this decree was dissolved in 2000 after a finding that it had achieved unitary status. 164 A student assignment plan adopted in 2001 required that "all non magnet schools maintain a minimum black enrollment of 15 percent and a maximum black enrollment of 50 percent," in a system in which approximately 34 percent of the students are black. 165 Five Justices voted to strike down both the Seattle plan and the Louisville plan; however, to understand the meaning of the case, it is necessary to analyze carefully the plurality opinion of Justice Roberts 166 and the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, who supplied the critical fifth vote. Justice Roberts, in a portion of his opinion joined by Justice Kennedy, suggests that diversity may be a compelling government interest only in higher education, because Grutter "relied upon considerations unique to institutions of higher education." 167 In a portion of his opinion not joined by Kennedy, Roberts referred to the design and operation of the challenged plans as "directed only to racial balance, pure and simple, an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate." 168 Later, he said "[r]acial balancing is not transformed from 'patently unconstitutional' to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it 'racial diversity.'" 169 Justice Kennedy joined the plurality in concluding that the school districts failed to show that their plans were narrowly tailored, particularly because they did not establish necessity and they did not show they considered methods other than explicit racial Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could go and could not go to school based on the color of their skin. The school districts in these cases have not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once again-even for very different reasons. For schools that never segregated on the basis of race, such as Seattle, or that have removed the vestiges of past segregation, such as Jefferson County, the way "to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis," is to stop assigning students on a racial basis. The way to stop discriminating on the basis of race is to stop discrimination on the basis of race. 171 Responding to this language, Justice Stevens, in his dissent, states:
There is a cruel irony in the Chief Justice's reliance on our decision in [Brown] . The first sentence in the concluding paragraph of his opinion states: "Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin." This sentence reminds me of Anatole France's observation: "[T]he majestic equality of the la[w], forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread." The Chief Justice fails to note that it was only black schoolchildren who were so ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of white children struggling to attend black schools. In this and other ways, the Chief Justice rewrites the history of one of this Court's most important decisions. 172 Justice Stevens goes on to attack what he calls the Court's "rigid adherence to tiers of scrutiny" because it "obscures Brown's clear message." 173 When it comes to affirmative steps voluntarily taken by school districts to avoid resegregation, it appears apparent that the plurality wants strict scrutiny to be fatal in practice. Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, refuses to recognize even the starkest racial imbalance as resegregation because the term segregation is reserved for de jure segregation. 174 and that "it is permissible to consider the racial makeup of schools and to adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which is its racial composition." 178 Most importantly, Justice Kennedy said "[a] compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue. Likewise, a district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student population." 179 He concludes by encouraging school districts to continue "the important work of bringing together students of different racial, ethnic, and economic backgrounds." 180 So, what does the decision in Parents Involved mean for the future? If the plurality view prevails, strict scrutiny will, in fact, be fatal, and states and school districts will simply have to accept resegregation that is not the direct result of government action. In contrast, if the four dissenting Justices prevail, affirmative steps to address the inequality inherent in segregation will be allowed. The key, of course, is Justice Kennedy and whether a school district can convince him that its plan is narrowly tailored. 181 The irony of the Court's rigid adherence to strict scrutiny in all cases alleging race discrimination, both invidious and benign, is that such scrutiny is not necessary to strike down invidious discrimination. 182 As a result heightened scrutiny serves no purpose other than to strike down benign race-conscious actions designed to achieve racial equality. A racial classification, the purpose of which is to disadvantage a racial minority, violates equal protection even if a court applies a heightened version of rational basis. For example, in Romer v. Evans, 183 the Court recognized "that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end," 184 but went on to strike down a Colorado constitutional amendment that prohibited the passage of any law banning discrimination based on sexual orientation because there was no legitimate governmental purpose, that is "the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected." 185 The Court relied, in part, on its earlier decision in U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 186 where it stated that if "'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest." 187 Based on the rationale of Romer and Moreno, invidious race discrimination would be struck down utilizing rational basis because such action is "born of animosity." 188 In contrast, affirmative government actions designed to promote racial equality have a legitimate governmental purpose-racial equality and equal opportunity-and the means utilized are rationally related to that purpose. In short, strict scrutiny is not needed to strike down invidious discrimination based on the Equal Protection Clause, but strict scrutiny serves to prohibit nearly all voluntary race-conscious steps taken by government in an effort to achieve racial equality. It is difficult to believe that this was the intent or goal of those who fought for the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT AS THE PROBLEM
The net effect of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence is that the Equal Protection Clause has become a huge barrier to achieving racial equality. It appears that the Court's message to government is that it is free to engage in invidious race discrimination so long as it is able to mask the discrimination. In other words, do not make the racial classification explicit and find proxies for your discriminatory purposes. Racial discrimination may flourish so long as it is disguised in a manner that makes it difficult for any challenger to establish the real purpose of facially neutral policies and practices. Similarly, benign efforts to promote equality that take race into account are more likely to survive if government is not transparent, that is, government attempts to mask its raceconscious decisions. Can this result possibly be consistent with the Equal Protection Clause? Is it possible that the clause has nothing to do with actual equality? Why did the Court choose this path?
To address the last question posed above, it is necessary to examine the "top three" decisions that have led to the current status of the law. 189 Starting with Milliken, the decision that severely limited the power of the courts to address segregation in elementary and secondary education by restricting the use of an interdistrict remedy, 190 we should examine what was at stake in the case, that is, the ability of whites to flee from integrated schools. It was easy for parents to flee from Detroit and move a few miles to a nearby, mostly-white, school district. 191 This was a less costly alternative to sending their children to a private, mostly-white, school. 192 The Court was unwilling to take this "right to flee" from parents, so it ignored the fact that Michigan, like most states, had made a conscious decision to vest control over its public schools in local school districts. 193 Even if fleeing is private action, not subject to the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment, certainly the organization and governance of the public schools is state action. In Norwood, the Court recognized what Mississippi was doing-assisting white parents who wanted to flee from public schools that were ordered to desegregate by subsidizing the mostly-white private schools-and found a violation of the Equal Protection Clause because of the impermissible effect of the state's action. 194 Why was Mississippi's action struck down while Michigan's was upheld? Of course there are factual differences, for example, Mississippi's goal was more obvious and Michigan's explanation (local control of public schools) was more legitimate, but are there real differences? In both states, the effect was impermissible in that it facilitated the private action of white parents who wanted to interfere with Brown's mandate to desegregate public schools. In short, Milliken allowed states to facilitate the efforts of white parents who were intent upon avoiding the Court's mandate to integrate public schools. This looks a bit like what the Court would not allow in Shelley v. Kramer, 195 when the Court reversed the decision of a state court in Missouri that was very willing to assist white parents who sought the assistance of government in carrying out a racially restrictive covenant. 196 While Michigan could not have prevented its residents from leaving the state to avoid integration, it certainly did not have to facilitate their efforts by ceding control of its schools to local districts and boards. 197 Following closely on the heels of Milliken, the Court in Davis made explicit what was implicit in Milliken, that is, discriminatory effects alone, without a discriminatory purpose, do not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 198 This decision was instrumental in gutting the Equal Protection Clause because the Court made it clear that the clause did not assure actual equality. 199 Davis paved the way for the Court's retreat from Brown in public education by making it clear that neither segregation nor resegregation violates the Equal Protection Clause so long as the challengers cannot prove it is the result of government action. 200 As made clear in a subsequent decision, government is now free to ignore the obvious discriminatory effects of its action so long as it masks any discriminatory purpose. 201 What was really at stake in Davis, beyond the employment test utilized by the District of Columbia? This decision goes to the guts of the Equal Protection Clause in that it relieved government of any constitutional obligation to promote equality by monitoring the effects of its actions. As stated earlier, in a more sinister way, Davis legalized government activity designed to maintain inequality so long as its purpose could not be unmasked. In other words, the Equal Protection Clause does not guarantee actual equality, only formal (de jure) equality. There is nothing in the language of the Equal Protection Clause that mandates the result in Davis, nor is Justice White's opinion for the Court compelling. Justice White refers to a number of prior decisions to support his conclusion that "our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact." 202 He concedes " [t] here are some indications to the contrary in our cases." 203 My point is simply that there is nothing in either the language of the Equal Protection Clause or the Court's prior decisions that dictated the result in
Davis.
Even if one is convinced that the purpose of the clause was to reach only intentional discrimination, the Court could have reached a different result by simply applying the well-established understanding of intent in tort law-"intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences." 204 Alternatively, the Court could have utilized the approach developed in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 205 for cases alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII. 206 Very briefly, under Griggs, the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by showing that a facially neutral practice has a significant disproportionate impact, thus shifting the burden of persuasion to the employer to show that the practice has a manifest relationship to the job at issue. 207 This is similar to the scheme employed in an equal protection case, Castaneda v. Partida, 208 where the Court held that a stark statistical disparity showing a substantial underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans selected for grand jury duty establishes a prima facie case 209 and shifts "the burden of proof to the State to dispel the inference of intentional discrimination." 210 So, in light of the credible alternatives to its holding in Davis, how can we explain the decision in Davis? Maybe the Court was simply unwilling to promote true equality by forcing government to prepare a "discriminatory effects impact statement" before it takes action. As suggested by Justice Stevens in his concurring opinions in Davis and Feeney, 211 the Court could have ruled in favor of the government in these two cases without gutting the Equal Protection Clause.
One more step and the Court's mission was complete-to avoid racial equality, it needed to subject affirmative government steps designed to promote equality to strict scrutiny. After several years of litigation, the Court accomplished this in Croson and Adarand. In an effort to disguise what it is really doing in these cases, several Justices insist that race-conscious actions will only perpetuate race discrimination. For example, in his plurality opinion in Parents Involved, Chief Justice Roberts states, without any supporting empirical data, that "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." 212 In the same case, Justice Thomas refuses to view racial imbalance as segregation 213 and argues that there is really no difference between invidious and benign discrimination. 214 Is there really no difference between an action taken for the purpose of promoting equality and an action taken for the purpose of hurting a particular race? Isn't the latter action "born of animosity," while the former action is wellintentioned? Even if it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the two, 215 in most circumstances, it will not be difficult and the trier of fact should be up to the task. 216 Assuming that all three of these "top three" decisions raise difficult issues, that reasonable people could differ, and that there is some support for the Court's decisions, these assumptions do not provide an explanation for why the Court selected the path it did rather than the path that would have promoted racial equality. Given the nature of constitutional interpretation, which leaves some slack in joints of the various provisions, it is quite apparent that the 213. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2769 (Thomas, J., concurring). 214. Id. at 2782 (criticizing the dissent's "rejection of the colorblind Constitution"). 215. Id. at 2786 n.27 ("How does one tell when a racial classification is invidious?"). 216. In considering a facial challenge to the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, the Court, including Justice Thomas, indicated it "has given state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty." Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007) . Should the same deference be given to legislatures when making judgments about the need for affirmative steps to achieve racial equality when there is uncertainty about whether specific steps will actually promote equality?
Court, beginning in the mid-1970s, deliberately selected the path that perpetuates and even promotes racial inequality. When a perfectly legitimate, reasonable, and justifiable alternative existed, the Court's choice is unjustified.
V. CONCLUSION
Contrary to Alexander Bickel's description of the Court, 217 in the area of racial equality, it is indeed the "most dangerous branch" because, with the exception of a short period between 1954 and 1973, it has consistently interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment in a manner that prevents it, and the other branches of the federal government as well as state and local government, from promoting racial equality. While the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery as a matter of law, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which serves to strike down most de jure discrimination, and several federal statutes that address discrimination by both government and private parties in certain activities have resulted in substantial progress in our society, they have not resulted in any semblance of racial equality. A major promoter of this sad state of affairs, I believe, has been the U.S. Supreme Court.
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